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Some pol'  ion problems can be jerious at early levels of development,
for instance because of lack of sewers.  However, most pollution problems tend
to become more pressing as countries develop before appropriate policies are
developed to contrcl them.'  One reason is that virtually all economic activity
results in some environmental degradation, but it may not become problematic
until  a  certain absorptive  capacity  is reached.  A  second reason  is that
protection  of  the  environment,  as  a  public  good,  requires  a  level  of
institutional and administrative capacity that has to he developed.
Health impacts,  particularly  in  urban  areas,  are  starting  to  be  reflected
in  morbidity and  mortality trends.  For example, in  the 1980s,  air  pollution  was
shown  to have a  significant impact  on  mortality in  Sao Paulo (Thomas  1981,  1985).
In Cubatao, evacuation has been ordered several time., when air toxicity has
reached levels a dozen times higher than acceptable thresholds (Anderson  1990).
Untreated and open sewers  have long  been known to be sources  of health risk, but
attention has also recently been drawn to contamination of groundwater.  In
Mexico, drinking  water related  illnesses  account for 75  deaths in 100,000  in the
age group 1-4 (Pearce,  1990).  Recent studies  carried  out for  the Bank in  Poland
and Hungary (Walsh 1990,  Hertzman, 1990a, 1990b) link  adveree health  effects to
pollution of air, water and soil.  Often the poor will be the first to suffer,
since they have little  political clout and few  alternatives;  in  the cities,  they
typically  live  in areas  where  health  risks  are  created  by  air  and  water
pollution, sewerage and waste problems.
Aside from  the impact  on health, there  are also effects such  as the lose
of agricultural output and biodiversity,  and increased  depreciation  of man-made
assets such as  buildings and  machirery.  Many places,  water pollution is  seen  to
'Since  sector shares and processes change, some environmental problems
may, in principle, become less acute with growth, even in the absence of
control policies.  When effective control policies are implemented,  the
environment may improve even when economic activity grows.- 2 -
be potentially costly  in terms of the  returns to tourism  (for example, the
Philippines, L'xon and Hodgson, in 1963).
Although rigorous studies  do not  exist,  there i8  casual  evidence  that
pollution  control  policies  in developing  countries  are  inefficient.  This
indicates that environmental imprcvements should  be achievable at comparatively
low costs.  Orten, regulations are not in place or they are inappropriately
designed or enforced.  In addition, economic  policies that are unrelated to the
environment nevertheless affect it, and often adversely.2
This  paper presents, with the heip  of a literature  review,  the design  of
cost  effec..ive  interventions  to protect  the  environment from  excessive  pollution
in  developing countries. The  concept of interver_.Lon  is  motivated by  the  typical
explanation for  environmental  problems in  economic  theory--external  effects.  If
the  parties  who  are  affected  negatively by  an  activity  cannot  themselves
influence che  activity, the  market fails,  since  their interests  are ignored  when
decisions are taken.  Then, there is a role for authoritative intervention to
affect the activity directly or indirectly.  A  cost  effective  set  of  policy
instruments  is  a set  that  can achieve  a  targeted  emission  reduction  at  the lowest
possible total cost.  The aim of the paper is  to review  the relevant  theoretical
and empirical econortiic  literature  (which, when  applied is almost solely on
developed country  examples), in order:  (a)  to distill  the principal lessons  and
evaluate general rules of thumb and (b)  to identify  gaps  that need to be filled
in order to make them more accessible and relevant to developing countries.
This paper defines broadly the range of policy instruments that can be
used  to  address  pollution  problems  in developing  countries.  It  includes
instruments  that have traditionally  been in  the realm  of public finance,  such  as
2Mahar (1989)  and Binswanger (1989)  conclude that deforescation in the
Amazon is accelerated by sectoral policies such as tax incentives; Repetto and
Gilles (1988)  provide similar arguments over a wider range of examples; Rosmo
(1989)  maintains that subsidies to energy, water and raw materials exacerbate
pollution problems in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Turkey;
Baratz (personal communication)  points out that the policies of low import
tariffs on used vehicles results in unnecessarily high pollution (and  fuel
bills) in many LDCs.taxes,  prices and  subsidiOes.  3 But it  also  covers  regulations  and (briefly,  her
instruments  designed to  affect  the amount  of  pollution  or  to  mitigate its  damage.
As described in Table 1, these interventions can be categorized as (i)  market
based  incentives  (MBIs) that affect the  incentives of private agents,  (ii)
command and control (CAC)  instruments  that regulate activity by source specific
constraints  and (iii)  government  expe.diture  on clean-up  or  enforcement. We find
it  useful  also to  distinguish between  those  instruments that  are  directly
associated with the amount of damage created or pollutants emitted, and those
addressing  pollution  indirectly  via  related  variables  such  as  inputs  and  outputs.
Table 1.  A Taxonomy of Policy Instruments
Direct Instruments  Indirect Instruments
Market Based  Effluent Charges,  Input/Outp;t  taxes
Incentives:  Tradeable Permits,  and subsidies,
(HBIs)  Deposit Refund  Subsidies to
Systems  substitutes and to
abatement inputs.
Command and  Emission Regulations  Regulation of
Control:  (source  specific, non-  Equipment, Processes,
(CAC)  transferable quotas)  Input and Output
Government  Purification, Clean-  Technological
Production or  up, Waste Disposal,  Development
Expenditures:  Enforcement and
Agency Expenditures
A direct instrument is addressing the level of damages or ewissions
directly, whereas indirect instruments  work via other variables.
Conditions to be Emohasized in Developing Country Policy Analysis
3Regulations  do also, if enforced, provide incentives  that affect
behavior.  We will, however, according to tradition, use the notions command
and control (CAC)  and regulation of approaches that specify the actions of
each subject (or  category of subjects) as legal or illegal, as compared to
open, flexible instruments  that leave  more choice to the subjects (see
Section 2).-4-
Developed and developing countries alike now find that they want to
manaqe  their  environmental  assets  with  greater  prudence.  But  developing
-)untr.os  co  front  cono raints and challenges that require special attentt.on  in
the design  of  pollution control policies.  Thus, while  using the  standard
assumptions  (competitive  markets,  costless  transfers,  certainty,  full
information) as a starting point, we analyze such conditions as are discuseed
below.
The scarcity of  public funds in  many LDCo,  the need to  protect the  poor
and  considerations  of  political  economy  all  indicate  that  transfer  mechanisms  are
not  well  developed.  Efficiency  criteria then  need  to  be  supplemented by
considering the distributive impact of different policy instruments.  weak
institutions  may severely  hamper  access  to information  and the  ability  to  monitor
damages and implement sophisticated schemes.  Under these conditions, it is
necessary to analyze what can be achieved  through imperfect  ncentives based on
blunt, indirect  instruments,  for  instance  by  applying  presumptive  pollution  taxes
to fuels.  Further, the frequently applied assumption of a competitive market
structure  may be less realistic (but  not necessarily  less useful as a  base line)
in an LDC  context than in an  i.ndustrialized  market economy.  The role and
functioning of instrument' such as taxes and quantitative regulations will of
course not be the same in  the presence  of market power, soft  budget constraints
and administered prices, as under the standard  assumptions.
Some "typical" developing country characteristics are not dealt with
explicitly.  For instance, it  may be claimed that environmental protection is  a
luxury good, and that LDCs cannot afford policies that may possibly constrain
growth and international competitiveness.'  Therefore, we concentrate here on
'We  do not present guidelines or results  on benefit estimation here, but
we caution against a general conclusion that emission control is unaffordable
and unnecessary.  In many developing countries, poor people without the means
to move or to afford protection measures are exposed to extraordinary health
risks.  Counterarguments can easily be made that emission control is an
inferior  good; once people have moved to other areas, water is treated and
sewage is piped, emission control is less necessary.  We do believe, that some
abatement will often be desirable even if the pressure on the environment is
low, provided the cheapest abatement options are selected.cost effectJve intervention, in order to show how to achieve a given emission
reduction  at the lowest possible cost.  These results are  useful at any level  of
desired pollution control, wherean assessing the optimal level of control would
require that marginal benefits t- estimated and compared to marginal costs, a
task which is not discussed in this paper.
The  analysis will be accompanied by empirical evidence on the cost
efficiency of alternative instruments  in different situations.  Evidence on  the
relative  cost  effectiveness  of  different  instruments  will  be  taken  from
developing  countries  to  the extent  it  is available, but most  quantitative
empirical evidence of this sort has to be drawn from developed countries.
To limit the scope of this paper, we treat pollution control policies,
but not policies to address other environmental problems, such as soil erosion,
deforestation, desertification or other natural resource problem5.  Many of the
principles  we present, however, broadly relate to the problem of correcting for
external effects, and can be applied  and to  these other problems as  well.  Also,
we focus on domestic problems and do not deal explicitly with trans-national
(acid  rain) or global pollution  externalities (climate  change/ozone  depletion).
Finally,  of the instruments  listed (in  Table  1),  we  do not  concentrate  explicitly
on government production or expenditures to clean the environment.'
Outline
The analysis starts  with  a set  of  underlying  deal -tions  that  allows for
the  simplest treatment,  and most  readers will  recognize the  result that a
pollution tax  (or its close relative, tradeable permits)  is recommended on
efficiency (welfare)  grounds.  Section 2 thus introduces  basic concepts such as
the  rationale for government intervention  when there  are negative  externalities,
and the results of intervention instruments  under very restrictive, simplifying
assumptions.  Although  these  results  are  widely  cited,  many  of  tne
recommendations change when the aseumptions  ars relaxed to conform more closely
5Public expenditures on the environment follows traditional analyses of
the optimal provision of public goods (see for instance Atkinson and Stiglitz
1980), as well as footnote 21.to  conditions  that  we  are  likely  to  find  in  developing  countries.  We
subsequently  extend  the analysis  of cost  effective  int3rvention  from  the  simplest
case  to  more  realistic  ones,  emphasizing the  role  of  conditions  that  are
prevalent in developing countries.
Section 3 discusses how the choice of instrument is affected when one
allows for:  (i)  distortive  and costly  public revenue  generation; (ii)  a limited
capacity  to monitor emissions; (iii)  uncertainty  about  the benefits  and costs  of
control; and (iv) a noncompetitive market structure.  Section 4 addresses two
aspects of distributive implications--the  protection of the poor, which is of
concern  from a welfare  perspective, and the  effects on groups with  vested
interests,  which are  relevant for the likelihood  of policy adoption.  The paper
ends with a concluding section and an outline of further research.- 7 -
2.  BASIC CONCEPTS
This section  outlines  the  economic  rationale  for  government  intervention
i.imed  at  addressing  pollution  problems,  and  presents  some  basic  results  about  the
choice of policy instruments.  These results are generally well known but are
derived from  quite restrictive assumptions. Section 3  will discuss  wznat  happens
to the  basic results when the assumptions are relaxed.
The  Rationale  for Government  Intervention
The efficiency argument in favor of pub;_c Intervention to mitigate
pollution problems is well established in the theoretical literature."  The
traditional justification is the need to  correct for external effects.  An
external effect occurs when the welfare of a household (or  the costs of a firm)
depends  not only on its own actions, but also on the actions of others.  Thus,
polluting  activities  are  often  seen  as  the  prime  example  of  a  negative
externality.
When there are no externalities, the planner would want to allocate
resources to  different uses  in the  same way as  a  (hypothetical) perfectly
competitive  market  would, thus equating  marginal  benefits  with marginal  costs in
all  markets.  When there are  pollution externalities,  the  market  mechanism  would
fail  to induce  the polluter  to consider  the costs  of its  activity  on others.  The
free market would result in pollution in excess of optimal levels, since an
industry  would pollute  until private  marginal benefits  equalled  private  marginal
cost (see  Box 1 for a diagrammatic exposition).  The interests  of those hurt by
pollution, as expressed in social benefits and costs, do not influence the
polluter.  Policies to address the problem aim either to regulate the level of
pollution at the source  or to change  p-.-:ces  or regulations so as  to increase  the
private costs of polluting.  The choice  between these  two types of policies  will
be discussed in the next sub-section.
'See  Baumol and Oates (1988)  and Tietenberg (1988)  for standard and
comorehensive textbook treatments.-8-
Box 1:  Correcting for Externalities




q.  q  Quantity
Assuming a  fixed relationshic between output q and emissions, the rationale
for  intervention is illustrated  4n Box figure la.  Social,  marginal costs
(SMC) equals  private marginal  costa  (PMC) plud tne  costs to  society  of
emissions.  Without intervention, the market settlos  for the price p' and
output q', resulting in excessive pollution.  Applying a tax t on emissions
or output,  in this  case equivalent, or  a tradeable  quota, the  socially
optimal quantity q* can be induced.
Box Fiaure lb
Usually, cleaner ways of producing are available as in Box Figure lb, where
both abatement a and output q is to be chosen.  The right part of  the  figure
extends  Box  Figure  la with  an  axis  de  ':ing  abatement,  and  a*  denotes
optimal abatement.  Ootimal abatenment  ana output can then be  induced by an
emission  tax  t(e)  or  tradeable  emission  permits,  but  not by  ta-.ing  or
constraining output.- 9  -
Are  public intervention  policies  necessary  to  correct  for  externalities?
According to the Coase proposition \Coase  1960), there is  no efficiency reason
for  a government to be involved in the regulation of pollution damage *xcept to
aseist in enforcing property rights.  Pollution will be curbed either when the
victxus bribe the pollute- or when the polluter bribes the  'ctime, depending
upon  who holds  the initial  rights  to clean  air or  water.  In  either  case, as  long
as negotiations are not costly,  the socially  optimal amount  of pollution  will be
the  result,  since  the  polluter  will  effectively  face  marginal  conditio..a
comprising the full social cost.
When  there  are  few polluters  and  victims  and when  the  number  of
beneficiaries from an agreement is given, the Coase proposition may indeed  be
valid,  so  that negotiations  can  provide  for  the  internalization  of  externalities.
Dixon and Hodgeon (1988)  cite  an example in  the Philippines  where soil sediments
caused by a dingle logger threatened the development of tourism in a bay.  In
Turkey, farmers  have been awarded  demages in  court  when emissions from factories
have hurt  their crops.  The  latter example  shoals  that  if the right to an
unpolluted  environment  is  established  and  enforced,  it  can  indeed  give incentives
to abatement.  Particularly  when stakeholders  are  easily identified,  a case can
made  that  intervention  is unnecessary  for efficient  outcomes,  although
credible law enforcement (a  public good) is often a necessary ingredient.'
The  validity  of  the Coase  proposition  rests  on  two  critical  assumptions.
One assumption is that transaction costs are zero or negligible.  In practice,
these costs will increase with the number of polluters and victims.  In Mexico
City, for  example,  there  are twenty  million  consumers,  2.5  million  motor  vehicles
and 30,000 industries; it hardly seems feasible  that these economic agents  will
conduct efficient negotiations without an intervening  authority.  Moreover, to
7Tns  role of liability  under an uncertainty is  treated in Section 3.3.- 10  -
be efficient in the long run, the agreement must accommodate entry  and axit'.
A  second assumption is that negotiation will be successful and that
agreements can  be enforced.  In  practice,  negotiation is a  difficult process  and
may not lead to a mutually beneficial agreement.  This is especially so because
the parties have an incertive to conceal information. 9 Private negotiation may
not be successful because a party has an incentive to free-ride either by not
revealing willingness to pay or by breaking the agreement.1 0
Once either of these assumptions is violated, public intervention  may
be the only efficiert solution.  Market prices are not the only mechanisms in
place that govern resource use, ho%ever, and therefore a careful examination is
warranted,  particularly  in  developing  countries:  traditional  management  of  common
property resources in a rural setting, for instance, may already incorporate
disciplinary elements that correct for local externalities.1'  These mechanisms
will often become less efficient, however, as population density and mobility
increase, and externalities extend across greater distances and longer time
periods.
'On  the long run efficiency of the negotiated solution  with well defined
property rights, see H.E. Frech III (1973)  and R.A. Tybout (1972)  and (1973).
Efficiency can be maintained if those who leave  and arrive can charge or be
charged for leaving and arriving.
9See, on incentive compatible demand revelation Groves and Ledyard (1977)
and Green and Laffont (1979).  Farrel (1989)  uses a simple approach to show
that an intervening  bureaucrat may be more efficient than negotiations, even
when the bureaucrat is limited to poor information  and there are only two
agents.
'Omany  mechanisms appear to be voluntary but require authority to define
rules and enforce them. A Lindahl equilibrium (Johansen  1963) is a set of
prices (taxes)  at which equilibrium demands are efficient,  but these are
prices that have to be imposed on trades. Since the pollution problem is one
of a prisoner's dilemma (resulting from free-riding),  efficiency can always
achieved if individual preferences are known and oinding agreements can be
made. Of course, such an agreement need not be in  terms of quantities, but may
be in terms of (Lindahl) prices. Still, however, trades and terms have to be
supervised (and  taxed or subsidized), so the need for authority is not
relinquished.
"Magrath (1989)  and Dasgupta and Maler (1990)  provide references.- 11 -
Basic Results  about Choice of Instruments
Given that intervention is  required,  what form should it  take?  Suppose
that the government  wants to reduce  the damages from  pollution by reducing  total
emissions from a variety of sources to a lower threshold level.  Some of the
basic choices faced by the government are:
o  Market based incentives (MBIs)  versus conmand and control (CAC).
O  Among MBIs, price based versus quantity based  instruments (in
other words, taxes and subsidies versus tradeable permits).
O  What the rate for MBIs should be and whether taxes or subsidies
should be used.
O  How tradeable permits should be priced and distributed.
O  Whether beneficiaries should be charged and victims compensated.
To  establish a basis for later comparison, we make the following restrictive
assumptions:  (i)  that the same amount  of emissions from  different sources  have
equal  external costs; (ii)  that transferring  revenue  to  or from  the  public sector
is  not in itself  costly; (iii)  that  the costs of  monitoring damage and  emissions
are  low;  (iv) that there is no uncertainty about the costs and benefits of
pollution  control; and (v)  that  a  competitive  market structure  prevails. Towards
the end of this section,  we study intervention  when emissions are not uniformly
dispersed.' 2 In subsequent sections, we relax  each of  the other assumptions  and
go on to discus. the role of distributive objectives.
MBIs  versus CAC.  In the case of uniformly dispersed pollutants,
ambience  quality  can  only  be  improved  (or protected)  by  curbing  overall
emissions.  Command  and  control  (CAC) simply  imposes regulations by  fiat;
constraints regarding emissions of pollutants are defined for each source and
trading among sources of the right to pollute is not allowed.  Most countries
have  relied  predominantly  on  CAC  by  setting  and  enforcing  standards  for
1Pollution  is uniformly dispersed when the external costs to society are
independent of the location  of the source.  One example is greenhouse gases,
such as CO 2.. ;;  ''  ,I  *,,  4h,-h  n,eane  that  an  activity  is  legal  only  if
M,S5  9P!  i vvr l  l  (MiB 1  )  provide  a  alternative  route  to  the  same
ri  .l  *  'eE  \,t  *r  '2Iag1flJ  poilUters  to  change  their  behavior  through
\tA  )C13ts  ':f  FolIutang.  MBIs  include  a  broad  range  of
,-,'r-rt22s.  rhe,r most  O0vioua  torms are environmentally  related  prices,  which
1a  -ii-pler.er.td  thr;,ugh taxea  on  emisrsions or  subsidies  to  abatement.  A
G  :.it  LI!.  tt  p  .P  .Ut  pelmits, unider  which a polluter is required to hold permits
h<r  thFe  af.J_n  emitted,  is also  included  among  MBIs  if polluters  are allowed  to
rai  ro  Lit9  aIn)nog  therrselves.
Aitnough  CAC' and  MBls  can  achieve  the  same  ambience  quality,  MBIs
ge:iera  iy provide  it  at lower cost;  in other words,  MBIs  are more  cost effective.
ScŽurLe  specillc  conlstraints allow  marginal  costs  to vary  among  polluters,  which
nplaea  tlat  t;-tai  custs  of abatement  are  not minimized.  In order  to minimize
t.'ta  ald;atel.lefit  coSts  (across  all  activities  or locations),  no polluter  should
0c  aa1.&i  tn  reouce  emissions  if another  can do so at lower  costs  (see Box 2 for
d  ;rjphi-a)  presentation).  '
Cont  ef  fective  abatement  can be achieved  by issuing  pernits  that  can be
tnvThi  (Ddles,  19'68  is one  of the early  proponents  of this  point).  A polluter
Wtrl  h'igh  coot  8  of  abatement  would  purchase  permits,  while  one  with  cheaper
a;-  itel-.ont  uptions  would prefer  to reduce  emissions.  Cost  effective  abatement  can
a-in  be achevedJ  iy a pollution  tax.  This  allows  each  source  to decide  whether
toc  pay  t  he tax  or tc uindertake  additional  abatement,  and each  source  will  abate
'Em  IEicr.  qxinta&n  and  permits  are here  used  synonymously;  a quantity
:1strume:.t  a  a  inre  aeneral term,  comprising  constraints  for  any kind  of
var  al-,  e.
'One  yenetral  criterion  defining  MBIs  should  be  that  it  allows  agents  to
eqqalize  the  shadow  prices  of  environmental  constraints  between  polluters.
This  means,  effectively,  that  polluters  face  only  one  overall  constraint,
which  regullates  behavior  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  a pollution  tax.  The
total  costs  of  satisfying  one overall  constraint  is always  lower  than  or equal
t-  those  c;f  satisfying  rany,  if the  constraints  add up to the  same.  This
definit3on  th-us  exp'ains  the theoretical  result  that  MBIs  are  always  cheaper
than  CAC.--  13 -
provided  that  marginal  abatement  costs  do not  exceed  the t ax  I  . a , 
for  CAC  to  minimize  society's  coat  are  if the  regulator  k'krt  ciii  '.t  E  itet-
account  each  firm's  abatement  costs.  That  would  be a  very  difficult  u,k  for any
government,  especially  one  in a developing  country  where  there  )R  flkely  t  be
many  heterogenous  polluters,  often  in an  undocumented  informaei se;tori-,  and  a
weak  public  administration.  A major  advantage  of MBIs  is thue thdt  the)  re-qvri
leBs  information  than  CAC  to be a cost efficient.  This  '"inforiiit  ion economy  of
market  based  instruments relieves the  regulator  from the  need  to  quantify
individual  abatement  costs;  these  are known  to the polluters,  and each  polluter
will use this information when exposed to MBIs.  However, both CAC and MBIs
require the regulator to have estimates about aggregate costs and benefits of
abatement in order to avoid excessive or suboptimal overall pollution control.
The full set  of regulations  affecting  emissions  can consist  of both CAC
and  MBI instruments,  and applied regulations  will often use  both types of tools.
In the U.S.,for example, some limited opportunities to  "trade" within a CAC
framework  has  been allowed in  an attempt  to benefit from  some  of the savings  MBIs
would offer (see Box 3).
Empirical investigations have strongly supported the theoretical case
for MBIs by reporting major costs savings relative to applied CAC.  Tietenberg
(1988)  reviews nine studies where applied CACs and MBIs are calibrated to reac},
the same ambience level.  For seven  of these, the  ratio of  MBI costs to  CAC costs
is 1/4 or lower.  For two of the studies,  the ratio is 1/14  or lower.
Prices versus auantity based MBIs.  Under the restrictive assumptions
in  this section, price based MBIs such as taxes and quantity  based MBIs such as
tradeable permits have exactly the same effect.'5  They result in the same level
of emissions  and economic  costs  (see Boxes  1 and  2 for graphical  expositions).
A uniform emission tax will have  the same incentive  effects as  an emission  quota
if the quota can be shared within the industry according to willingness  to pay.
'5The  equivalence breaks down under uncertainty about abatement costs,
which is treated in the next section.- 14 -
Both minimize overall abatement costs, as high-cost abaters will choose to pay
the tax or will outbid low-cost abaters for shares of the quota.
Although taxes and permits that can be traded freely are conceptually
equivalent,  some  analysts  have  argued  that,  for  administrative  reasons,  tradeable
quotas may be preferable to tax or price instruments (Baumol and Oates 1988).
First, in  order to find  the  tax  that  will result in  the desired  ambient quality,
the public authority may need several rounds; set a price, measure resulting
ambience quality, adjust the price and so on.  This may be a costly process,
particularly in inflationary environments when  such fees must  be frequently
adjusted."[  Second, permits may  be easy  to  implement, since they  make  it
possible to introduce controls  without increasing  the costs  of existing firms.' 7
But the administrative arguments can work both ways.  For example, an
indirect pollution tax on fuel consumption may  fit more easily into existing
administrative processes than  a quota  (Anderson 1990).  In most  developing
countries, if emissions can be addressed effectively via input taxes, this is
likely to be easier to implement  than a completely new scheme such as a permit
trading.
Settinci  iprice  based  MBIs.  If  governments  use  a  pollution tax  to  protect
ambience quality, they should select a  base and  a rate so that  the external  cost
of the activity is internalized.  Such an instrument  is often  called a Pigouvian
tax.1 8 The appropriate base for the tax should be the damage caused or a close
6 sThe  problems of uncertainty about response to policies, and of "sticky"
instruments, are treated more thoroughly in Section 3.
"The  new source bias" (stricter  controls for new plants) is often
interpreted as incumbents being able to influence regulations to their own
advantage, and thus in appropriating rent (Baumol  and Oates 1988, Hahn, 1989).
Under CAC, however, a new source bias may actually be efficient if (and  only
if) technology is more flexible ex ante than ex post.  Insight into such cost
aspect is redundant for efficiency under MBI.
"Since A.C. Pigou'e (1920) seminal contribution, "Pigouvian  taxes" has
been the expression used for taxes to discourage activitieps  with negative
externalitie3.- 15  -
lBox 2  Xarket-based Incontives (MDI) are Always Cheaper Than
Command-and Control (CAC)
The value of equating the costs across sources can be  illustrated
diagrammatically in figures 2 and 3.  Figure 2c illustrates a supply curve
resulting from  (horizontal) summation of marginal cost of the individual
firms in 2a and 2b.  The unregulated  market *stablishes  the price p' (figure
2c), and equalizes private marginal costs (PMC)  between producers, so that
output  q'  is produced  at minimum  costs.  An  emission  tax equal  to the
marginal social cost of emissions would induce the market to establish the
efficient output level  q*, and distribute production efficiently  between the
two firms, q,  ,  2.  In Figures 3a and b, we have assumed that the planner
does not know the individual firm's marginal costs, and he has given the
firms equal quotas that add up to the social optimum.  As is seen in 3, the
planner will reach his output target but production is inefficient since
firm 1 is producing units which firm 2 could have produced at a lower cost.
Only with luck or knowledge of individual cost functions could the planner
have avoided these welfare losses when applying untradeable quotas (CAC).
Fiaure 2  A tax is used to induce socially optimal quantity q*
a  firm  onoi  suppl  b  firm two  supply  C  sggregeto  supply and  demand
SMC2  D~~~~~~~EMANDIm
¢2 .2
Fiaure 3:  Quotas q,  +  -2 q* are used to induce the
socially optimal quantity q*
*  firm  one,  supply  b  firm  two,  supply  C:  Ngia  $upgl*  ed  Xdmwnd  l
_  SMC
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proxy for it, such as emissions.' 9 An example could be a carbon tax, which has
lately been proposed as a tool for efficient reduction of the emissions that
cause global warming.  Other examples are taxes applied on air pollution in
France, on emissions into  water in Germany and on solid  waste in Denmark.1
What determines  the rate  of  the tax? With  a fixed  relationship  between
output and damages, the  rate of  corrective tax  on the  polluting  good  will be the
marginal rate of substitution in consumption between the externality and the
commodity times the number of individuals affected by the externality 21. Thus,
the higher the damage created  per unit of satisfaction  due to consumption  of the
good in question, or the higher the number of people affected,  the higher will
be  the  corrective  tax.  The  fact  that  this  tax  fully  internalizes  the  external
effects can be seen by deriving consumer demand under the resulting relative
prices;  the  consumer  adjusts  as  if  he  himself  faced  all  the  damages  his
consumption creates.  Note that there  is no need to tax complements or to
subsidize substitutes  when the tax on the polluting  good fully internalizes  the
externality.
The Pigouvian incentive could be either as a tax on pollution or as a
subsidy  to abatement.  In  the short  term, the incentive  effects can  be the same.
In the long term, when  entry and exit can be affected, a tax will normally be
preferable.  The  symmetry is broken because firms may be induced to enter a
1 9The relationship between damages and emissions often varies by the
location of source.  This is discussed in  the next subsection.
NWhalley  and Wigle (1989) and Opechoor and Vos (1989).
2'The  proportional  tax  rate  will  be  tifi  -n . u  m+1  ,  where  Pm is  the
P.  Um
consumer  price,  u.+,  is  the  marginal  utility  of  the externality (negative),  u.
is the marginal utility of consuming the externality creating good m and n is
the  number  of  individuals  affected  by  the  externality.  The  familiar formula
reminds  us  that  the  problem  posed  is  one  of  optimal  provision  of  public  goods:
the  sum of  the  marginal rates of  substitution  in  consumption  is  to  be  equal  to
the  marginal  rate  of  transformation  (Oakland,  1987,  for  an  exposition  of  the
argument).- 17  -
subsidized industry  and the net effect  would be a higher than efficient level  of
pollution.
Quantity based MBIs:  distributina  and charoina for  tradeable 2ermits.
The initial distribution of pollution permits does not have implications for
efficiency as long as they can be traded.  Firms or individuals for whom it is
costly to reduce emissions can acquire permits if they are held by others that
do not need them that badly.  The price reigning in the market for permits will
give incentives to abate in the same way as a pollution tax would.
While  permits  could  be  auctioned  and  thus  distributed  initially
according to willingness to pay, it is often suggested that they be dietributed
free of charge.  The revenue and distributive implications of that choice are
dealt with later in this paper, but some caution is necessary.  If permits are
distributed at a charge lower than the market price, the recipients receive a
privilege, and it is necessary to ensure that this does not provide undesired
incentives in  itself.  For instance,  a free  flow  of permits  to a firm should  not
be  conditional  on the firm's  behavior, since  such  a  condition  could  distort  other
choices or prevent the permits from  being sold  to others  who could  use them more
efficiently (e.g.  allocation  of permits  should  not  be  dependent  on the firm  still
being an active  producer).B  If  cheap  distribution is  desired initially in  order
not to shock implicit property rights, one could increase the charge gradually
so that a less discriminatory regime is eventually established.
Charging  Beneficiaries/Compensating  Victims.  The  question  of
compensating  victims  is  often  raised  under  a  mixed  agenda  that  includes
'Let e,  be emissions from a firm  or an individual i, let c(ei)  be external
costs related to emissions and t(e 1) be an incentive scheme;  t is taxes paid
(if  positive) or subsidies received (if  negative). Efficiency of incentives
requires that t'= c' where t' and c' are t and c differentiated  with respect
to ei. This condition allows for a tax on emissions or a subsidy to
abatement.  However, if t(e) is to be fa,:ed  by all individuals,  practicality
recommends that t(O) =  0.  Then  it is clear that t(e)-c, so that emissions
should be taxed rather than abatement subsidized.
2'The  Coase proposition states neutrality of initial distribution of
rights, which is by definition unaffected by behavior.- 18  -
efficiency as well as equity considerationsA  An efficient  incentive scheme
must  give proper inducement  to  any  action that  can  reduce  external costs,  whether
it  is to reduce own emissions, to reduce consumption of a polluting commodity,
tn engage in recycling or clean-up activities or to takv protective measures
(like  moving).
Thus,  from  an  efficiency  point  of  view,  it  is  not  necessary  to
compensate victims or to charge beneficiaries.  It would be possible to charge
beneficiaries or  compensate victims  for other  reasons without reducing the
efficiency of the incentive scheme if these transfers could be made independent
of activities that themselves affect the level  of external costs.  Compensation
should  then be designed so  as not  to give incentives  to people to  become a  victim
(or to  suffer more).  Charging beneficiaries can easily create free rider
problems, for instance if a citizen can benefit freely by pretending not to be
interested.
Compensation  necessarily  plays  a  major  role  in  schemes  without
(significant) intervention, both in the theoretical Coasean scheme and under
negotiations/common law liability. The zero sum  budgets  of these programs imply
that any charge paid will be received by another party, and this can typically
cause problems in practical situations (incentives  to become a victim, to take
inadequate protection measures or to avoid being counted among beneficiaries).
In the theoretical situation described by Coase, there is no potential for
inefficiency,  since the options and preferences  of each agent are assumed  to be
known with certainty.  Often, mere numbers will  indicate that the incentive
problems of compensating victims are miniscule.  For instance, it is difficult
to  imagine that  revenues  from pollution  taxes would  excessively stimulate
migration  to  a  city,  even  if  the  revenues  were  used  solely  within  city
boundaries.
2'Efficiency  aspects are dealt with thoroughly in Baumol and Oates (1988).- 19  -
Dispersion and the Availability ef  Differentiated Instruments
Most pollution problems have an important spatial dimension.  While  we
have  chosen  not  to  treat  the  jurisdictional  issues  here,2  cost  efficient
strategies  often require  differentiated  instruments  even  within relatively  small
regions.
Pollutants are usually not uniformly dispersed but are concentrated in
some pattern around the source and downwind or downstream.  The result is that
some sources pollute locations  that are  more vulnerable at  the margin than those
polluted by other sources.  These differences in damages per unit of emission
depend on  where the sources are located  and  on the dispersion -haracteristics  of
their  emissions  (determined by  such variables  as  stack  height,  speed  and
temperature of flow,  etc.) as well as on the nature of the site being polluted.
For  many major air pollutants,  the benefits  of emission reductions  have
effectively been seen as negligible in  vast rural areas, and the application  of
uniform emission charges (or one-for-one tradeable emission permits) in zones
comprising both urban and rural areas  would not then be cost effective.  With
uniform  emission  charges,  improvements in polluted  locations would  require
unnecessary abatement from  many sources whose emissions do not pollute the "hot
spots".  In  these cases, the least  cost  program requires  that abatement for  each
source  depends  on  whe-  her  its  emissions  will pollute  vulnerable locations  or  not.
Such a program can be  mplemented by instruments  related to the damage  that each
5Ideaily,  spatially differentiated instruments should be available to
reflect the spatial nature of the pollution problem, but jurisdictional issues
would usually involve constraints on instrument choice.  See Siebert (1985)
for a general treatment of spatial aspects, and Pearce (1990) for a discussion
of the Mexican case.
6We  here use the rural/urban dimension to illustrate differences in
marginal damages per unit of emissions.  The principle, and the need for
differentiated instruments, is of course valid for any pattern of nonuniform
damages (or, equivalently, benefits).  One area A may be more vulnerable than
B in principle (biotopes, crops, children), but less important to protect in
practice if higher present pollution loads in B makes the marginal damage in B
higher.- 20 -
source causes.  Such "damage" instruments can be envisa-ed as emission charges
differentiated according to the ratio of damages to emissions.
Damage differentiation for permits is achieved bv an ambience permits
scheme (APS). Under an  APS, a  polluting source  must hold a different  permit for
each location reached by its  emiesions.2  The value of each type of permit will
depend on the vulnerability of the location to the emissions.  The APS is ideal
from a theoretical point of view, but may be costly and difficult to implement,
given that there will be many interrelated  markets for the various permits.
An  emission permit  system (EPS)  treats  all  emissions  from  sources  within
a  zone  equally, while banning trades between zones so that each source needs to
purchase only one type of permits.  An EPS cannot generally be cost minimizing
since, within zones, differences in damages between sources are ignored and,
between zones,  it relies on the  initial distribution of permits.  It can,
however,  be  fairly  efficient  if  a  region  is  divided  into  zones  that  are
internally homogeneous  with  respect to  the  ratio of  damages  to emissions.
Optimal zoning  would trade  off  the  costs of  uniformity  within large  zones  and  the
costs of banning additional tradea associated  with smaller zones.
In essence, differences in damages per unit of emissions means that
unlimited trading of permits is not desired.  Between zones,  permits need to be
distributed  carefully,  since  sources  are  barred  from  solving problems  of
misallocation  through  trades  (see Box  3  for  some  applied  limited trading
schemes).
If  a region  contains  polluters  with very different  ratios of  damages to
emissions, differentiatinc instruments accordingly can yield significant cost
savings. Consequently,  the costs  of applying  uniform  emission  charges  or  permits
without r.oning  will also  be high. Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982)  calculate  that
27A region is subdivided by a grid, with a sensor for ambience quality in
each grid cell.  A dispersion model calculates how many permits polluter i
needs for grid cell j  for each unit he emits.  If i wants to pollute, he needs
to hold permits for several "receiving" locations,  the prices of which are
determined by supply (vulnerability,  regulators) and demand (nearby  would-be
polluters).- 21 -
the savings of a least cost scheme for control of particulate emiasions in St.
Louis would fall from 5/6  to 2/3  of CAC costs if uniform instruments  are applied
within three zones, and  to 1/2 if  one zone is  applied. Seskin,  Anderson and Reid
(1983),  modelling control strategies for nitrogen oxides in Chicago, find that
savings of 13/14 relative to CAC fall to 1/2 if instruments have to be uniform
within industries,  while a scheme  with completely  uniform instruments  would cost
twice  the  CAC.  The  latter  result  indicates  that  the  regulators,  not
surprisingly, have had an eye on the geographical dimension when designing the
scheme, and thus did better than an MBI scheme which ignored it.
Box 3.  Emission Permit Trading In Practices
Emission trading has been tried for industrial  emissions to air and water in
the US, and  a provision similar to the offsets is in place in Germany.
Expanded provisions for emission trading are proposed for the amendments to
the US Clean Air Act in the US (1990).
Netting  allows for internal trades within a firm in the following way; a
firm can avoid the stringent emission requirements for a new source if it
reduces emissions from existing sources.
Offsets  address  the  problem  that  new  pollution  activities  cannot  be
introduced into areas not in compliance with air quality standards.  Through
the offset provision, a new source may be created if it reduces emissions
from another source by an even greater amount than it  will emit itself.
Bubbles places an imaginary "bubble"  over a factory.  This allows a firm to
add-up emission constraints on its various sources and thus comply with the
general rather than the particular requirements.
Banking allows a firm that emits less than its legal limits to be credited,
and the credits can be used later or sold to others.
Lead  trading was allowed between refineries from 1982 to 1987, when they
were required to reduce incrementally the lead content of gasoline.
The savings from limited opportunities  to trade within bounds like these are
substantial if the trade that are allowed are between sources that would
otherwise abate d at vastly differing marginal costs. Hahn (1989)  estimates
that the savings related to netting, offsets, bubbles and lead trading have
been  considerable  (between  $1  and  $12  billion),  while  the  impact  on
environmental quality has been zero or insignificant.
Source:  Hahn (1989)  and Opcchoor and Vos (1989),  and others.- 22 -
3.  rFFICIENCY UNDER  ALTERNATIVE  ASSVKPTIONS
In this section, we discuss how the basic results in Section II are
affected when we take up alternative assumptions regarding:  a public revenue
constraint, inability to monitor emissions and damages; uncertainty; and non-
competitive  market  structure.  As  pointed out  in the  Introduction, these
alternative assumptions may better describe the situation confronted by many
developing countries.
Pisouvian Taxes Under a Public Sector Revenue Constraint
Public  budgets  are  tight  in  many  developing  countries.  Raising
additional  revenue  through  existing tax  structures  can  often  have  adverse  effects
on resource allocation, as firms and households adapt to a distorted regime.
Although tax reform can reduce these costs in many counatries,  such changes
themselves are also costly, and the record  of success is uneven (see  World Bank
1988; Thirsk, forthcoming, for recent reviews).  One of the attractioas of
pollution taxes is that they can raise revenue while improving efficiency, as
firms and  households are persuaded  to reduce  negative  externalities.  When there
is  a public sector revenue requirement, pollution  taxes have  a role to play in
the overall tax structure.  The question is  at what rate they should  be imposed.
As is well-known from traditional optimal tax theory, taxation should be broad
based in order to minimize distortions.  For the polluting good, an additional
"Pigouvian" term will apply.2  Non-polluting  commodities will be taxed less
than if  there were no net  proceeds from  corrective  taxes, since  these reduce the
need for and  the costs  of raising  revenue from  distorting taxes.  Consequently,
taxing of commodities with negative externalities will  not only reduce the
efficiency losses  due to  externality  itself (say,  damage from  pollution)  but  also
the efficiency losses related to revenue generation.
2See Box 4 for a rigorous exposition.  The result is from Sandmo (1975).- 23  -
Box 4.  Taxing Externalities  Under a Revenue  Constraint
The  purpose  of  an optimal  tax  structure  is to  collect a  given  revenue
requirement for the government in a way that minimizes the resource cost of
taxation. Since no tax structure can tax everything,  taxation has the effect
of diverting resources towards untaxed goods and services (such as leisure
and goods not marketed formally).  The dtstortions created by taxation mean
that the diverted resources could have been better used.  For this reason, a
tax structure aiming to minimize the costs of taxation will  tax as many
commodities as possible so that they can be taxed at low rates. Further, it
will tax commodities with inelastic supply and  demand relatively  heavily, as
for these items behavior will not be much distorted.
Sandmo (1975)  examines the role of taxes that correct for  externalities  when
taxes also serve to moet a given revenue requirement.  He shows that the
resulting tax structure, according to intuition, combines the features of
broad, distortion minimizing taxes on all commodities, and a Pigouvian tax
on the polluting good. In the case of zero cross price elasticities, the
formulas are simply:
U ti - (1-M)  (-1  )  and  t.  - (1  -p  (-1)+  p  (-n  U,
PI  El  P.  e  U.
where t is the tax rate, P is the producer price, m is the polluting good, i
is any other good, e,  and a.  are compensated own-price elasticities.  U.+
is  the  marginal  utility  from the  externality  (negative) and U,  is  the
marginal  utility  from consumption of good m.  As  we  can  see, each tax
formula is  a weighted sum, with the weight (1-p)  given to an expression of
the same form to all commodities, and the weight  . given to a Pigouvian
term, which applies to the externality creating good only.  The term airned
at reducing pollution equals the number n of individuals affected by the
pollution, times the ratio of disutility of pollution per unit of utility
from consumption of the polluting good.
Some  intuition can  be applied to  how the  corrective tax  influences the
overall tax structure by interpreting the weight p,  which is the ratio of
the shadow price of private income to the shadow price of public income.
This rate will be between zero and one when taxation is costly, since costly
transfers of  resources to the public sector will take place only  if the
shadow price of the public revenue constraints is the higher.  As &  special
case, if the proceeds from the optimal Pigouvian tax are  sufficient for
public expenditure needs, p  will equal one and there will be no need for
distortive taxes.
Generally, proceeds from Pigouvian taxes will make it possible to lower the
rates  of distortive  taxes,  so that  pollution  taxes  will  reduce  the  overall
resource  cost of taxation  in addition to providing incentives to reduce
pollution.
This  complementarity  between  revenue  and  environmental  objectives
supports the case for  charges (or  auctioned  permits),  even though the charge  and
the base that maximize revenue are not equal to the  efficient rate and base.  No
studies exist of pollution tax revenues within an optimal tax structure, but- 24 -
empirical  studies  indicate that  revenues  from  efficient  pollution  control
policies will be of the same order of magnit.de as total control costs.  In a
simulation of particulate control in St. Louis, Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982)
found that permit charges would be in the some range as abatement costs.  The
share of charges in total control costs to the firms  gets lower  as the level  of
air quality targeted get higher, and the share is higher for emission re'ttad
schemes than for the least cost (differentiated) scheme.  A study of control
strategies for  nitrous oxides in Chicago (Seskin,  Anderson and Reid, 1983) also
finds charges in the same range as control costs for their three schemes.
Table  2 illustrates  that  the  present  use of  charges is  not  of impressive
significance in  terms  of  general revenue  in  OECD  countries (OECD,  1989). At less
than a  third of one percent  of  GNP in  the Netherlands  and  at 0.04  percent or less
of GNP in the other surveyed countries, the revenues were found to be of no
importance for the general budget.  The OECD study further showed that the use
of charges to change behavior was extremely rare, since rates were too low and
the  base  was  usually  not  sufficiently  responsive  to  individual  behavior.
Proceeds from  pollution  charges  were an  important  mechanism  for  funding  selective
environmental expenditures in some of the countries, however, where they were
earmarked for  this purpose.  Pollution charges  may yield more or less than what
is needed for environmental expenditures, so the benefits of such earmarking
should be examined in the context of overall nublic expenditure analysis.- 25 -
Tabkle  2.  Revenues of Effluent Charge Systems Compared to GNP
Medium
Air  Water  Waste  Noise  Percent of
(Million  ECU)  GNP
France  19  240  n.r.  6  0.04
Germany  n.r. j/  135  n.r.  n.a  l/  0.01
Italy  n.r.  n.a.  n.r.  n.r.  n.a.
Netherlands  n.a.  473  0.8  14  0.27
Switzerland  --  --  --  4  0.00
United States  n.r.  n.r.  n.a.  --  n.a.
a/  Not relevant. _/  Not available.
Source:  Opuchoor and Vos (1989).
Inability to Monitor Damaaes or D  issions:  A Role for indirect Instruments
Excluding monitoring  and enforcement costs, the  efficient  economic
policy  (whether MBI or CAC) is to address the external effect directly.  if
emissions cause disamenities, then taxing or regulating emissions accordingly
will provide the desired signals.
In reality, monitoring damages or even emissions at the source  may be
costly, particularly in the context of developing countries, for technological
and  institutional  reasons.  Even when  monitoring  is  technically  feasible,
institutions may be too weak to ensure prudent and honest enforcement, thus
rendering inefficient instruments based on emissions  monitoring.
When environmental damage or emissions cannot be addressed directly
because  of  monitoring  and  enforcement  costs,  the  regulator will  base  his
intervention  on  variables related  to emission, such  as  the outputs and inputs  of
the polluting  industry, and substitutes and complements to its outputs.  We
categorize  these instruments  as indirect  instruments. An  example can  be indirect
pollution taxes applied to  fuels such as gasoline, which can be  viewed as
presumptive Pigouvian taxes.  How will the policy choices discussed in the
previous section  be affected?  Monitoring costs  will  often not affect  the choice
between MBIs and  CAC instruments,  since they  will usually both  be influenced  in- 26 -
the same  way.2  With indirect instruments,  the "tradeability"  results apply, in
that actions  that reduce (increase)  presumed  emissions by an equal amount  should
receive an equal  subsidy  (tax).  In assessing the desirability of  indirect
instruments,  the  reduced  cost of  the  externality must  be  compared  to  the
di8tortions they create  themselves by also affecting  ;ther choices.  A fuel  tax,
for instance, is  efficient if  the relationship  between consumption  and emissions
is fixed, if non-polluting fuel use will be unaffected or is insignificant  and
if fuel consumption can be monitored relatively  eauily.0  It will be relatively
inefficient alone, however, if the fuel is used in polluting as well as non-
polluting activities.  Also, abatement opportunities that are not triggered by
fuel economy (such  as catalysts and scrubbers)  can still be socially  attractive
options, but require instruments  other than fuel taxes.
The rest of this subsection reviews the literature on how to minimize
the costs of undesired incentives  related to indirect instruments.
Outputs and inputs as a base.  Here we present some important results
on  how  pollution  from  consumption  activities  can  be  discouraged  by
taxing/subsidizing the  polluting good and/or  goods related  to it in  demand.  The
use  of  input taxation  to  reduce pollution from production  activities when
production is polluting is guided by the same  principles.
The  most important  result is  that if  pollution  is  determined  one-to-one
by the consumption of one good, then taxing it according to marginal external
costs  solves  the whole  problem;  there is  no  need  for  additional instruments  since
an equivalent to an emission tax has been found.  Carbon taxes on fuels appear
9Some  authors claim that to monitor compliance is  more difficult if
permits are tradeable.  Hahn (1989) indicates  that some resistance towards a
specific trading program was motivated by these concerns for validation of
trades.
NMonitoring  consumption should not be read literally--for example, a fuel
tax levied at one unsurpassable point in production or distribution would be
sufficient.  The stage at which a tax is levied sets a limit on the
information content of the instrument however; input taxes may better
influence input choice, but be less able to distinguish between sectors than
output taxes.- 27 -
to  be a good  example, since  their  external  effects  are independent  both  of source
location and of combustion process.  When pollution is not determined fully  by
an observable, taxable variable, an incentive  scheme  must rely on the existence
of complements and substitutes, in other words, on own and cross price
Box 5.  Possible Bases for Pollution Taxes
Damaae  Created:  This  base  makes  it  possible  to  differentiate  between
polluters according to the amount  of the damage caused per unit of emission.
Each source equalizes marginal abatement costs to individual differentiated
marginal benefits.  No such taxes  have  yet  been  applied.  Examples of other
damage-related instruments:  liability for accidents, such as oil spillage
(MBI).  Offsets,  bubbles  (MBI) and  zoning  (MBI/CAC) policies give  some
consideration to the location  of the source, and thereby to the locations it
pollutes (damages).  Ambience permit systems are markets in damage quotas,
and have been simulated but not tried in practice.
Emissions:  Minimizes  the  costs of  abatement  by  equalizing  MCA  across
sources, but does not differentiate between sources according to damages.
Emission  charges  fail to  provide  incentives to  relocate within  region.
Examples:  tax on emissions to air in France, water charges in Germany,
waste charges in Denmark, manure taxes in Netherlands.
Inputs in and Outputs of Poliuting  Activities:  Gives a proxy that can mimic
an  emission  or  damage  tax  (imperfectly).  Fails  to  give  incentives to
minimize  emissions  (or  damages)  for  a  given  level  of  inputs/outputs.
Examples:  lead in gasoline  (taxed in Norway, Germany, regulated in many
other countries).  Fossil fuels in general are taxed in many countries, and
sulphur content in fuels is regulated in many countries.
Fixed Inputs of Polluting Activities:  Equipment with different emissions
characteristics can provide some  basis for incentives, but will fail to give
incentives with  respect to how carefully and frequently the equipment is
used,  and  also  fails to  influence maintenance.  Tax  differentiation  is
applied  according  to emission  characteristics of  cars  (Norway, Germany,
Netherlands, Sweden), whereas these characteristics are regulated in many
countries.  Noise characteristics of aircraft are taxed in many countries.
Installation of  'clean" equipment/processes is subsidized or mandated  in
many countries.
Other  Activities:  Subsidizing  substitutes  and  taxing  complements  are
alternatives  if  the  polluting  activity  is  untaxable,  and  can  also  be
valuable  supplementary instruments.  Taxation of  complements (except for
complementary inputs, above) is  not known  to be applied.  As a substitute  to
private transport, urban mass transport is subsidized almost everywhere.
Unreturned Items:  Depending on cost relationships, many materials will be
recycled without intervention, particularly if labor is cheap.  When it is
desirable to have  additional incentives to recycling because of external
costs,  a  deposit  refund  system may  be efficient.  Such  depon\t  refund
systums have been proposed for  batteries, and are in place for  car hulks and
beverage containers in Scandinavia.- 28 -
elasticities of demand.  A quite intuitLve result is that if a polluting good
cannot be taxed fully, a related good should  be taxed if it is a complement to,
and subsidized if it is a  substitute for, the polluting good.  For example,
suppose that private vehicle use in  urban areas is  polluting but cannot  be taxed
sufficiently  (or only at a prohibitive cost).  A clean substitute such as a
subway  should  be subsidized,  but  a  clean complement  such  as  central  parking  apace
should be taxed.  This holds unambiguously as long as demand for subway and
parking space is unrelated.
When there is more than one good related to the untaxabl- polluting
good,  the  answer  may  depend  on  whether  the  related  goods  are  themselves
substitutes or complements to each other.  Wijkander (1985) illustrates  some  of
the principles involved in  the use of indirect instruments in a  model where the
demand for three goods (one  polluting but untaxable and two clean) are closely
related.  If both  of the  related goods  are complements to  the externality
generating good, they shouLd  normally both be taxed.  Somewhat unintuitively,
however, if the related goods are strongly complementary to each other, a tax
Quld apply only to one while the other would be untaxed, or even subsidized.
The case  in which the two related goods are substitutes to the externality
generating good is  analogous; a subsidy  normally  applies to  both unless  they are
strong substitutes  to each other.  In  Wijkander's framework,  it is  thus  possible
for  apparently counter-intuitive  results  to take  place.  These  occur  when demand
relations  other than the ones  that have  been intentionally  exploited  are strong,
so that undesired distortions c n  result from the use of indirect instruments.
In our motor vehicle example, if public transport and central  parking space  are
sufficiently strong substitutes to each other, subsidizing subways and taxing
parking spaces may  lead to over-consumption of the former.  If this problem
arises, parking space should not be taxed and may even have to be subsidized.
Sandmo (1976)  presents  another  problem  in  which indirect  instruments  are
useful.  A commodity is  used by consumers  for  two  purposes,  only one of  which  has
negative  external effects. An example  would be gasoline  use, which in  some  cases- 29 -
can be maid to be "innocent"  when used for  countryside  driving but which creates
pollution and  congestion when  used  in cities.  The planner,  in this case,
observes the demand for fuel  but not how the commodity is used.  A commodity  tax
to address the externality is itself  distortionary, because it implies  taxation
also of the "innocent"  use.  The  question is  whether an additional instrument  on
a  related good can reduce  the costs  of  that distortion. Under certain  conditions
that  relate  to  the  regularity and  stability of  the  demand  system, Sandmo
concludes that the externality generating commodity should be taxed.  Further,
a  related good  should  be taxed  if  it is a complement to the externality
generating activity  and a substitute  to the innocent  activity,  and subsidized if
it  is  a complement  to the innocent  activity  while a  substitute  to  the  externality
generating activity.  If the related  good is either  a complement  or a substitute
to both the uses, a tax (subsidy)  will apply if the higher relative degree of
complementarity applies to t1  7  externality-generating (innocent)  good.
Balcer  (1980) presents  a  model  where  some  consumers  create  more
externalities than others per unit of externality generating good consumed.
Difference. in  demand elasticities are  exploited in  order to  affect the  behavior
of  "large offenders" more than the behavior of  consumers in general. As  a
starting point, a tax on the externality generating good only (equal to the
marginal damages) applies when there is no correlation between the identity of
the large  offenders and how complementary  the related good is. In this case, we
have no need for  an additional instrument  on the related good 3 . However, if  the
related good is  more (less)  complementary in  demand for  the large offenders  than
for the small offenders, the related good should be taxed (subsidized).
Balcer's  results  can be  compared  to  those  of  Wijkander  by  again
considering the transport example.  Now there are large offenders (private  car
commuters) and  small offenders  (countryside drivers).  The two models then
largely agree, but Balcers  (and  Sandmo's) framework adds that central parking
31This  baseline is consequently identical for Sandmo (1975)  and 1976),
Wijkander (1985)  and Balcer (1980).  We may attribute it to Pigou (1920).- 30 -
space  should be taxed even if a fuel tax is applied to discourage driving in
general.  This is  because  taxing a  commodity  that is  a complement  to  city driving
makes  it  possible  to  discourage  city  driving  without  taxing  "innocent"
countryside driving proportionately  .32
Only fixed  inputs can  be addressed.  If  one cannot  monitor emissions  or
variable  inputs and outputs, one can still achieve some desired response by
regulating monitorable fixed inputs such as equipment and installations.  When
it is difficult to observe what people do and earn, governments have often
resorted to  presumptive taxation  for revenue purposes, based  on observable
proxies  for  income such as  land ownership or  house size.  To  correct for
externalities, the  analogous approach would  be to  tax pollution generating
equipment as if it were used  (when use  is unobservable) and to tax cleaner
equipment  at  a  lower  rate.  As  opposed  to  presumptive  taxes  for revenue
collection, presumptive taxes make sense only if they affect behavior.
One can thus look at technical standards as indirect instruments  under
monitoring  costs.  The  reason why  such a  common strategy has been heavily
criticized by  economists is  that the regulatory  approach  has  tended  to  be applied
in a mandatory, uniform and thus excessively costly  manner.  It  has also tended
to be in the form of command and control whereas we have used the example of
selective  equipment  taxes/subsidies  differentiated  according  to  presumed
emissions.  Oftan, regulations  have been stricter  for new sources, thus failing
to minimize costs and possibly increasing the market power of incumbents.
Further,  theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence have made
the point that little benefit results from "clean  technology installations" if
32'he  urban transport problem includes both pollution and congestion
externalities, which ideally call for both spatial and hourly variation in
instruments.  Congestion tolls are treated in Shah (1990).  The results of
Sandmo, Wijkander and Balcer fit nicely with propesitions  made later
(Greenwald  and Stiglitz, 1986), in which corrective taxes and subsidies are
derived for market failure in a more general framework, utilizing the demand
system in the way shown here.- 31 -
they are not properly maintained or used3.  If  pollution control is to be based
on such imperfect instruments  as mandated technical equipment,  one must keep in
mind that, with the equipment they have, polluters will still pollute to the
point where their marginal private benefits of doing so reach zero.  It is not
sufficient  to lower  the relative  price  of  the  cleaner  technologies;  one  must  also
check that the sum of emissions from the resulting private optima will be lower
(see  Box 6 for an example).
Incentive  incomDatibilitv  of  indirect  instruments. Indirect  instruments
alone will not enable the government to provide all the d-eirabl- incentives.
In particular,  indirect instruments rely on specified relationships between
emissions and other variables.  Consequently, actions that can change these
relationships, such as some innovations, can be difficult to stimulate with
indirect instruments.  For instance, a fuel tax alone (or a quota on gasoline
use)  provides  incentives to  reduce  emissions as  long  as  emission  economy
coincides with fuel  economy, but  does not  give incentives  to actions that reduce
emissions per unit of fuel consumed.  A catalytic  converter is an example of an
abatement initiative that is not encouraged by fuel taxes, since it does not
increase  mileage.  Devices that increase  daily operating costs may even require
periodic inspection to ensure appropriate maintenance and use.
It can be  instructive to view the pollution control agency as the
purchaser of a public good, trying to provide for  the general well-being.  3  If
it  can  monitor the depletion  of the public  good directly (emissions,  damage), it
will  do so  and then regulate  or charge  for damages.  If  the agency  cannot  monitor
emissions,  it  will  regulate  or  charge  for  related  variables  (proxies),
33Baumol and Oates (1979),  Hahn (1989).  The EPA tested 2000 vehicles in
use between 1972 and 1976, of which 80 percent failed  to meet the emission
standards of their model year.  Much was ascribed  to deliberate cheating by
car owners; half ascribed to tampering with the pollution control equipment or
improper driving or fuel use (Russel  1990).
34Charging  for the depletion of a public good amounts to the same thing.
Even when permits are traded between sources, the regulator is the ultimate
buyer when approving each trade.  Without his participation, all would be
sellers, the price would be zero and the environment would be polluted.- 32 -
effectively paying for initiatives  that reduce its  expectations about emissions
from a given source.  However, using a proxy to provide incentives  has inherent
shortcomings.  In  particular, a presumptive  instrument  will not induce  people to
act in  ways that  will reduce emissions,  unless  the actions also reduce  the value
of the proxy."
Often, monitoring more direct variables such as emissione rather than
fuel  consumption is  not impossible  but costly. Similarly,  a  closer  match  between
expected  emissions  and actual  emissions can  be  achieved by  including more
variables (vehicle characteristics in addition to fuel consumption), but at a
cost  of  monitoring additional  variables. An incentive  scheme  based  on  additional
variables  will always be able to induce  desired  behavior better or  equally well.
The trade-off  between the gains from  introducing  a new variable in  the incentive
scheme and the increased costs in  terms of monitoring and enforcement is dealt
with  in the  literature on  incentives and contracts  (Maskin and Riley, 1985
provides a relevant model).
Charges and Permits Under Uncertainty
Even  under  perfect  monitoring,  the  effects  of  environmental  policies  may
be uncertain  for  a number  of reasons.  The  benefits from  abatement  may be  subject
to events that are inherently difficult  to predict.  For example, the impact of
air  pollution  can depend  on  the general  health  status  of the  affected  population.
Also, the costs of abatement depend on the flexibility of polluters, which
cannot be known with certainty, and  in particular not  by a regulator.  In
developing countries, institutional  development  and  data collection  and  analysis
will serve to reduce the role of uncertainty over time.
35The  relevant analogy from markets in private goods is when there is
asymmetric information about product quality, and the buyer looks for
characteristics of the product or the seller that indicate  true quality.  The
efficiency costs of this information asymmetry is discussed by Akerlof (1970);
he finds that, under certain conditions, there will be no market at all.- 33  -
Box 6.
Incentives from Indirect Instruments:  Control of Mobils Sources in the US
What  many  polluted  cities  in  developing  countries  have  in  common with
developed  country urban areas  is that motor  vehicles contribute a major
share of  the  emissions  of  the  mcst  troublesome  pollutants.  The mix  is
different,  however; LDC  cities  have a  higher share  of heavy  commercial
vehicles,  thus  also  of  diesel  engines. No  country  relies on  continuous
measurement of individual emissions, so all policies are related to inputs.
The emission control problems also have some slightly different features;
the economic  lifetime of a vehicle will often be  longer in a developing
country, thus rendering policies that solely regulate  the characteristics  of
new cars less effective in the medium term. Also, if institutional capacity
is less developed, there is probably less scope for inspection programs to
induce maintenance that keep emissions down.
In the US, vehicle emissions of such substances as lead, carbon monoxide,
nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons  have been targeted by the provisions in  the
Clean Air Act with  impressive results. Measured as emittea quantities per
mile from new vehicles, hydrocarbons  are down by 95 percent, carbon monoxide
by 96 percent, nitrous oxides by 72 percent and lead by 95 percent.
The  achievements  have  been  accomplished by  increasingly strict tailpipe
standards for new vehicles, with which auto  manufacturers have had to comply
as well as by restricting lead in fuels.  Thus, the major control instrument
has been source specific constraints  applied to equipment, as opposed to two
other alternatives.  Cars could have been taxed presumptively according to
emission characteristics, and instruments  addressing  variable inputs  such as
fuels and road use could have been introduced.  There are some apparent
efficiency problems related to the chosen equipment CAC strategy, some of
which are partly addressed by supplementary instruments such as:
Incentives  to  maintain  low  emissions.  Emission  characteristics  may
deteriorate over time due to deliberate tampering or negligence. For areas
not  in  compliance  with  federal  air  quality  standards,  inspection  and
maintenance programs are mandatory, but since testing is preannounced the
reading is an inaccurate and biased indicator (Stedman at al 1990).
Regulation addresses ownership, not use. By addressing fixed equipment  only,
no incentives are given to use the car less,  and low users are not given
options to invest less in abatement equipment.  The problem is only partly
addressed by  supplementary instruments such as fuel taxes. Neither urban
road user charges nor taxation based on odometer reading is  used.
Lack of geographical  variation.  Pollution levels are not problematic in the
countryside, and more problematic in some cities than in others. Stricter
tailpipe  standards  are  now  recommended  for  the  most  polluted  cities,
inspection programs are mandated only in  non-compliance areas and fuel taxes
vary between states (while  low everywhere compared to Europe). Road charges
and subsidies to public transport are probably indispensable if one wants
stronger geographical variation, and this would  allow  for lower overall
costs.- 34  -
How are  the recommendations  about the  choice of instruments  affectod  by
uncertainty?  One result is that the equivalence of price based vermus quantity
based instruments may no longer hold.  Another result is that in an uncertain
environment, flexible instruments are better.  Also, liability rules may be an
attractive option.
The nature of the uncertainty.  A widely cited advantage  with quantity
instruments is that emission standards are met with certainty regardless of
uncertain costs.  While this 's true, price instruments ensure  that emission
reductions are acquired at a certain cost.  The conditions under which one
instrument  type is  favored  over the other  has been studied  by Weitzmann (1974).X
The planner has to choose between price or quantity controls,  bas-d on
ex ante probabilit  distributions  of  benefit and  cost functions  while  minimizing
the ex post efficiency coets.  An important result is that when the marginal
costs of abatement are known, uncertainty about tne benefits does not favor one
instrument over the other.  Firms abate only on the basis of their costs and  of
the policy instrument, which are both known.  So, even if the benefits deviate
from expected levels, the abatement level and the efficiency losses will be
exactly the same for the price and the quantity instrument.
When  abatement costs  are uncertain, producers are assumed to  have
information which the planner does not have, and their actions may therefore
differ from those the planner had expected.  The result is a distinction in
efficiency  between intervention  via  prices  and  quantities  determined  by the  shape
of the benefit and cost functions (Weitzmann  1974):
When  marginal  costs  are  nearly  flat  (while the  marginal
benefits are steep)37 the smallest miscalculation or change
results in either much more or much less than the desired
36This  distinction does not relate to whether policies should be MBI or
CAC, as long as quotas can be traded.  The issue discussed here is that under
uncertainty, the equivalence between a quantity instrument and a price
instrument  may not hold.
370ur  remark.- 35 -
quantity.. Using a  price control  mode in such  situations  could
have  detrimental  consequences.., the  contre  cannot afford
being even slightly off the mark 3
In other words, the quantity instrument,  which can guarantee an emission level,
is better if it is costly to realize unexpected emission loads.  Similarly, the
price  instrument  is better if deviations in emissions are  less costly than
unexpected  marginal abatement  cost,  since  the  price instrument  fixes  the  marginal
abatement costs.  As an example, consider  a case in  which a collective  treatment
plant has zero variable costs and fixed capacity and in which stressing the
capacity  constraint has detrimental consequences.  If the marginal abatement
costs for  each source  are flat,  one would  want total discharges  to be  within the
available treatment capacity.  A quantity instrument such as tradeable permits
would serve that purpose while a price instrument would risk costly under  or
overutilization.  A steep benefit curve similar to this case is illustrated in
Box Figure 7b.
The relevance of uncertainty in an empirical example was studied by
Kolstad (1986),  who evaluated policies to control sulphur emissions from power
plants.  Uncertainty about future electricity demand resulted in uncertainty
about abatement  costs.  He found  that if  marginal  benefits  were constant,  a  price
instrument  would be slightly  preferable,  but that a slight slope  would  be enough
to make permits the more desirable option.  Lyon (1989)  arques that tradeable
permits are particularly attractive from a developing country point of view,
mostly  because  they  provide certainty  about ambience quality  in  a dynamic
context, but also because they allow implicit property rights to be changed
gradually.  One could, however, interpret developing countries' caution with
environmental policies in a  way that would favor  price instruments.  If  marginal
benefits are seen as fairly flat  while the costs  of abatement  could  be steep  and
mBaumol and Oates show that prices minimize ex post efficiency losses if
the marginal cost function is steeper  than the marginal benefit function,
while tradeable permits are better if the benefit function is steeper.  They
use linear marginal cost and benefit functions,  with the stochastic  term
shifting costs in a parallel fashion.- 36 -
are  uncertain  (Box  Figure  7a),  price  Instruments  could  ensure  that  no
surprisingly costly controls are implemented.
Box 7:  Prices Versus Quantities Under Uncertainties in Abatement Costs
MCA'  MCA
E  (M  CA)  E(MCA)






Emissions  q'  Abatement  Emissions  q'  Abatement
Box  Figure  7a  Box  Figure  7b
Marginal abatement costs are uncertain; MCA' and  HCA  illustrates likely
outcomes, E(MCA) expected outcome.  Since marginal abatement costs will
differ from expectations, there will be a welfare loss associated with
abatement that is not optimal, evaluated ex post.
In each figure, an area like L.  illustrates expected welfare loss with a
price instrument p', and L.  illustrates  expected welfare loss with a
quantity instrument q'.  In figure 7a, the marginal benefits of abatement
are flat relative to costs, and a price instrument  will minimize welfare
losses.  In  Figure 7b,  marginal benefits are steeper and a quantity
instrument minimizes welfare losses.
If several instruments can be used to force realized allocations to
approximate  (ex post) optimal ones as closely as possible, a combination of
instruments may be better than only a quota or a price.  Along these lines,- 37 -
Roberts and Spence (1976)  suggest a permit to  be accompanied by a (high)  fee for
further  emissions and by a promise to repurchase unused parts of the permit (as
a subsidy to additional abatement) at a (low) price. "The subBidy provides a
residual incentive for firms to clean up even more when costs are low.  The
finite penalty provides an esca?e valve if costs are very high."  Thus a permit
alone can be interpreted as a special case under this scheme,  where the subsidy
is zero and  the penalty is  prohibitive.  What this scheme  adds is  an opportunity
for  emissions to be higher if the costs  of abatement are very high (so  high  that
the planner would have distributed more permits, had he known), dnd it provides
incentives for  a cleaner  ainbience,  should  abatement  costs  be low.  If,  as Roberts
and Spence assume, the permits are tradeable, the costs of abatement will be
equalized so the resulting ambience standard will be achieved at leaat cost.'
Instrument flexibility.  In  the above  problem, the planner e  .blished
the rules and the producers reacted to them.  What if the planner can to some
extent adjust his use of instruments when information is revealed?  The above
results may change if some instruments are more easily adjusted than others.
Bawa  (1988) suggests a mixed policy under the  assumption that a regulatory
instrument  (command and control) can be implemented with greater  speed and
flexibility than a charge (or  a tradeable permit).
The structure  of the problem as follows:  Assume that effluent charges
can be changed only sluggishly, but that stochastic changes (for example, in
weather conditions) make the ambience quality resulting from a steady flow  of
emissions  worse in some periods  than others,  the periods being  too short for  the
effluent charge  to be adjusted  accordingly.  If  a command and  control instrument
can be used directly on the worst days (factories  closed down indiscriminately
or randomly under "smog  alert"4), the increased  abatement is achieved though it
"Beavis and Walker (1983)  analyzes a problem in which individual
emissions are stochastic, and in which an ambience quality constraint is to be
satisfied with a prespecified probability. The scheme involves  two charges,
one for the mean of emissions and one for the variability of emissions.
ePlourde and Yeung (1989).- 38 -
may not  be efficiently  distributed. A  constant  charge alone  will result in  high
abatement costs, since there will be excessive abatement all days when the
absorptive capacity of the environment is  high.  The lower the charge, however,
the more often abatement will have to be implemented by command and control
measures, which means that, during those days, abat-ment will be inefficiently
distributed among firms.  A mixed policy consisting  of a charge that maintains
the ambience standard  on  most days supplemented  by  command  and  control  to  provide
additional  abatement on the rest of the days is suggested. This would trade off
the benefits  of the efficient  inter-firm distribution of  abatement through
charges and the costs of abating excessively on windy days.  Sebastian (1989)
reports that industry and regulatory authorities in  Mexico city have signed an
agreement of pollution alert and shutdown when ambience concentrations reach
critical thresholds.  Over the last few years, there has been two to three
shutdowns.
Liability to victims as an instrument.  Under asymmetric information
about actions taken to avoid damage, the polluter's liability for actual damage
can be useful under certain conditions.  Bohm and Russel (1986) writes:  "if
monitoring of actions to avoid causing damage is expensive...but the source of
actual discharges or spille could be identified  ex post, a liability rule might
usefully substitute for a regulator rule".
Liability under  these  circumsta,.ces  has  strong parallels with  the
Coasean  proposition  that  negotiations  without  intervention are  efficient.
However, negotiation (unde.r  the  threat of litigation)  will usually  take place ex
post in the case of liability,  so there is not much concern about the potential
victims unless they are well protected legally. 4'
If  there  are  no  problems  either  with assessing  responsibility  for  damage
or with representating the victims' interests, it seems that both liability  and
prior  regulation  can  do  the  job  of  providing  incentives  for  prevention.
''Also,  the Coasean "neutrality" of initial distribution of rights  ay not
hold under asymmetric information, so that a universal obligation not to
inflict damage can be necessary for efficiency.- 39 -
Intervening  with a set  of instruments defined in  advance provides advantages in
terms of preparedness4 2 and standardization,  and ideally  represents the interest
of all victims with no coordination problems (though with certain uniformity
constraints  that are inherent  in  any regulatory  procedure). Liability  allows  for
more flexible case by case damage assessment but may be costlier and may face
serious problems in representing all victims interests.
Incidents  such as  the Bhopal  catastrophe  and the  Prince  William's Sound
oil spillage (with  sizeable damage awards  and losses  of reputation for  the firms
involved)  probably  make firms  aware  of their  potential  liability,  and  thus induce
them to the additional  care.  The incentives resulting from  potential liability
may be limited  by the following,  however:  low likelihood  of detect_.n, costs  of
litigation and representation of victims, as well as by the quality of the
judicial process.  In the end, the entity found liable  has to be solvent for  the
penalty to be real.  Ringleb et. al finds a tendency that small, independent
firms take over  the business areas with greatest risks  in the U.S., where
liability is generally unlimited.  This trend could indicte  that less  wealth is
backing  the potential  liabilities, and thus  less powerful incentives.'  In
addition to  these  considerations, Bohm  and Russel  note that  the  liability
instrument may provide incentives for people not to protect themselves against
pollution, since the price paid by the polluter is actually received by the
victims.  Koletad et al. (1990)  add  that uncertainty  about liability  assessment
gives a  rationale for supplementing  ex post liability  with regulatory  standards.
Case by case solutions  such  as liability  suits  and negotiations  between
polluters and vicuims are complementary to regulations.  Farrel  (1987) thus
proposes  that  a  regulatory  framework  should  solve  problems  that  cannot
effectively be solved by complementary case by case approaches.  This would
42No  doubt, this preparedness can assist in assessment of responsibility
for damage, as when it results in a monitoring capacity.
'An example could be that Shell has announced to pull out of oil
transport in U.S. waters (Financial  Times, June 15, 1990).- 40  -
indicate  that intervention (taxeB  or  permits) is  less  necesBary  when  culprLts  are
few and  easily identifiable (major  oil spills)  than when the likelihood  of being
held  responsible  by  victims  is  low  (as with  many  air  pollutants).  The
complementarity of the two approaches is discussed at length in PoBner (1986,
Chapter 13)..  ."between  the common  law  system  of  privately  enforced  rights  and  the
administrative  system  of  direct  public  control..  .should  depend  upon  their
strengths and weaknesses in particular contexts".
Noncompetitive Market Structure
The basic rules about  policy intervention  as outlined here are derived
from the assumption that markets are competitive.  But in many cases, such an
assumption is untenable.  In many developing countries, markets may be small,
entry barriers, tariffs and transportation costs high, and access to credit,
technology and law enforcement limited.
How  do  the recommendations  regarding  policy  intervention  change  when  the
polluting firm is also a  monopoly (such  as a utility) and uses its market power
to supply less than optimal output?  In this case, there are two sources of
market failure--pollution externalities and  market power.  Two instruments  (for
example, a subsidy on output to correct for  market power and a tax on emissions
to correct for external effects) are sufficient to achieve efficient resource
use.  The rate of tax on emissions would  then be guided by the same rule as that
for competitive firms, since the firm would set their prices equal to marginal
private costs.
If a tax on emissions is not feasible because of monitoring costs, can
one remaining instrument, a tax or subsidy on output, address both sources of
market  failure?  Buchanan  (1969) proposed "the dismantling of the Pigouvian
tradition", based on the argument that since  the monopoly's output is less than
optimal already, a Pigouvian tax on output is likely  to aggravate this problem.
Baumol  (1972) dismissed Buchanan's point as insignificant, noting that most
significant pollution problems are affected by "large numbers" of firms.  This
claim pays insufficient attention to the fact that it is the number of firms- 41 -
within each industry, rather than behind each pollutant that matters (Burrows,
1981).  Analyzing  more general pollution  control instruments,  Burrows  points  out
that the risks that pollution taxes will increase welfare losses rise as the
importance  output reduction in  pollution abatement  rises;  equivalently  the risks
get less as the importance of process switching (or end of pipe purification)
rises.
Thus, the point that a  monopoly may ir fact already have internalized
an optimal Pigouvian tax through its  exertion of market power is a theoretical
possibility.  The problem of calculating  a "second  best fee"  on the grounds  that
"the environmental agency...will typically have neither the authority nor the
inclination to offer subsidies to monopolists... it is empowered only to tax
emissions" (Baumol and Oates, 1988) then weighs these needs against each other
when calculating the effluent charge. The result is  a sum  of a  Pigouvian  tax and
a subsidy to output.  This sum collapses to the familiar Pigouvian tax if the
industry  is competitive, and it is zero, as Buchanan suggests, in the special
case  where the two cancel  each other  out. The  derivation  of a second  best fee for
oligopoly would depend on the behavioral assumptions about the firms,  but would
essentially incorporate  the same  trade-off between the concerns of market power
and excessive pollution.
Utilities  are  usually  prime  examples  of  monopolies  in  developed
countries, but  they  are often  subject to  controls both  on  pricing and on
emissions.  In  developing countries,  utilities  are  often  public and loss-making,
which  warrants  some  additional  study  of  behavior  (for  example,  profit
maximization,  and  even cost  minimization,  may  be  unrealistic)  before  an  incentive
scheme is designed.
The problem of imperfect competition is more troublesome if abatement
is to be regulated within a market for pollution  permits.  If  the permit  market
does not result in competitive  pricing,  abatement  will not be efficient,  even if
the number of permits available is optimal.  Since permit markets will often be- 42 -
fragmented, interdependent  and thin,  this  may provide an additional  argument for
using price instruments.'
Another problem is that pollution abatement policies may themaelves
influence the market structure.  A number of authors study how the theoretical
recommendations of abatement policies can affect the number of firms (Deewes
1983,  Kohn 1985,  1988,  Mestelmann 1988,  Spulber,  1985). This literatur.  broadens
the usual partial equilibrium,  short-run  perspective  by studying  how the effects
on  inframarginal profits affect entry, exit and capacity investments and by
allowing  for  economies  or  diseconomies  in  abatement.  One  result  is that
different policies may affect the number of firms, and thereby the extent  of
market  power.  This  result  is  intuitive, but  contrasts the  neutrality of
nonmarginal rewards derived in short term models.
If a firm's exit from the market would be triggered by a  reduction in
its  profits, the number  of firms  will be  reduced  by any policies  making  polluters
pay  . 45 Quotas  and  standards, similarly, could  provide  for collusion among
existing firms,  if  they raise  the costs  of  entry. Assuming competitive  behavior,
Spulber (1985) shows that an optimal effluent charge (or number of tradeable
permits) will yield the efficient number of firms and efficient output even if
there are economies or diseconomies of scale in abatement.
There  are  many  claims  that  industries  in  developed  countries  have  become
more concentrated as  a result of  environmental  control policies (paper  and pulp,
copper smelting).  It is not clear, however,  whether this is a necessary result
or whether the excessive focus on mandated equipment has allowed for increased
'It is here assumed that the polluters suppose they cannot influence the
effluence charge. If polluters behave strategically to manipulate the charge,
problems similar to those in permit markets will emerge.
45The  polluter pays principle (PPP),  as defined by the OECD (1975, 1989),
has some desirable and some undesirable implications for effic.ency. It has
been a guideline within the OECD since 1972.- 43 -
concentration.46 However, there are other examples such an fossil-fueled power
generation in  the  US, indicating  that pollution  control  policies have  eroded some
of  the possibilities  for economies of  scale, thus  giving a boost to  small
plante. 41 In developing countries, small firms in the informal sectcr are often
major polluters.  While restructuring  and concentration  could lower  the costs  of
monitoring  and enforcement, this would often be at the unacceptable cost of
closing down lean and flexible production capacity.  A suitable policy should
take account of the effects of the control approach on the plant population, in
order not to spur major restructuring (and  possibly market power) unlees it is
necessary.  Flexible indirect instruments may be a  way to curb emissions from
small firms, while avoiding to force them under ground or out of business.4
""As  noted earlier, abatement activities that rely on equipment and fixed
installations  may justifiably be preferred to other, equally cheap abatement
options if the are less costly to monitor.
47Gollop  and Roberts (1983)  report find econometric ovidence.
48The  size of firms could yield economies of diseconomies of scale in
production, abatement and monitoring.  The latter has not been dealt with in
theoretical literature.- 44 -
4.  DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS: WELFARE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
We  will  here  discuss  two  rationales  for paying  attention  to  the
distributive  effects  of  environmental  policy.  Up  to  this  point,  we  have
concentrated on the efficiency aspect of policy instruments, which is a good
criterion if one is interested in minimizing total costs.  However, minimizing
total costs need  not  be a  dominant  criterion if  mechanisms for  distributing  costs
and benefits  are net well  developed.  One  rationale for looking  at distributive
effects  is that  an increase  in the  income  for certain  groups  (for example,  the
poor) may be valued more highly  in social welfare terms than that of other
groups.  Another is that the government should know who benefits and who loses
so that it  can judge whether a particular reform  will have sufficient  political
support to be adopted and implemented.9
Environmental Policies and the Poor
What impact do alternative policies to control pollution have on the
poor?  Does government need to consider compensatory mechanisms for protecting
the poor?
The distribution of the benefits of pollution control is an empirical
issue.  The evidence on the differential  health  effects of reducing  pollution is
mixed.  Several authors have noted  that the poor are likely  to benefit more (see
Anderson 1990), since they tend to live in poor health and sanitary conditions
in polluted urban areas and cannot afford to protect themselves or move.  U.S.
studies' have shown that air pollution is  worse in cities  that have a large  poor
population.  Within cities,  air pollution is  worse in  the areas  where poor live.
It has also been found  that air quality improvements  have bpen more significant
in areas with many poor, so  that in quantity terms the air quality improvements
"QThe  perspective of this paper is  policy analysis under a well defined
welfare objective.  In this context, insights from  public choice models are
relevant mostly for problems of policy adoption and implementation.  See
Buchanan and Tullock (1975).  Hahn (1989)  and Zechhauser (1981)  for
applications to environmental policies.
'"These  studies are reviewed in Christainsen and Tietenberg (1985).- 45  -
appear to have benefitted the poor more than the rich (Asch  and Seneca, 1978).
While  such  observations  may  be  important, theoretical  arguments  and  some
empirical  evidence  indicate that  the  willingness to  pay  for environmental
improvement  among wealthier individuals  may be higher than that among the poor.
Such differences in willingness to pay could make the wealthy the principal
beneficiaries (Christaineen  and Tietenberg, 1985).
In most of the studies comparing the incidence of alternative policy
instruments, the distribution of benefits is generally assumed to be uniform.
An exemption  is Harrison  (1975) who notes that the policies to control air
pollution from  motor vehicles in  the  U.S. have  affected  the rural  poor  badly  both
on the benefit side and on the cost side, since their car ownership rates (and
thus control costs) are necessarily high while the environmental benefits in
their  areas are  modest.  Harrison  concludeb  that  the  costt  of controlling  vehicle
air pollution have been progressively distributed within cities but have been
regressive  overall, since  the  poor in  rural  areas  have  suffered from  higher costs
of private transport without having alternativee.  Proposals that would address
this incidence  problem  by introducing  stricter  emission requirements  for "urban"
than for "rural" vehicles are included in the proposals for the 1990 Clean Air
Act  Amendments, requiring  "cleaner" cars  and fuels to be sold  in the most
polluted cities.  Such differentiation is desired for efficiency reasons also,
if damages per unit of emissions are lower in less polluted areas.
The incidence  of the costs  of alternative  pollution  policies depends  on
the ability of polluters to pass on the costs to customers, to other producers
(if  intermediate  goods are produced) and  to workers.  Thua,  one needs  to analyze
the elasticities of demand and supply in production and consumption as well as
the amount that poor households spend  on  the polluting goods.  A higher  gasoline
tax for  example,  may have very little  effect  on slum  dwellers  who own no cars  and
who do not use public transport.  A diesel price hike may affect commuters and
rural communities that depend on commercial or public transport.  Regulatory
intervention can also have distributive effects because it affects the cost of- 46 -
doing business,  which can  be shifted forward  to price. or backwards  to labor  and
capital.  The poor may be more vulnerable  to selective  price increases, and may
be  more at risk of unemployment if an industry  becomes uncompetitive."
In industries for which environmental regulations are  very costly,
changes in costs and practices  may affect incidence.  For instance, if labor is
a  substitute for polluting  inputs, abatement policies can lead to increased
labor-intensity  in  production,  and  may thus  result  in  increased  employment  and/or
increased remuneration of labor.  In a simple theoretical general equilibrium
framework, Forster  (1983) analyses the effect of  sector specific abatement
requirements, modelled as an increase in  unit costs in that industry.  with two
mobile  factors in fixed supply and flexible factor prices, the  factor most
intensively used in the affected sector  will lose while the other factor will
receive  increased  remuneration.  Alternative  assumptions,  such  as  the  introduction
of  price/wage  rigidities (and  thereby  possible  unemployment)  or immobile  factors,
can, of course, give different results.
Most empirical studies incorporating the incidence of costs do not
explicitly compare alternative instruments.  Pearson and Smith (1990)  find  that
carbon taxes sufficient to reduce carbon emissions in UK by 20 percent would
raise  eight billion pounds in  the short  run  and three billion pounds in  the long
run, the decline representing a decline in the rate necessary to sustain lower
consumption.  The tax would be highly regressive, reducing the welfare of the
poorest with up to 2.7 percent compared to only 0.4 percent for the richest
decile.52 They do find, naturally, that if all the proceeds were redistributed
to the poor the scheme could end up being progressive.
Since the poor are likely  to have a  greater  propensity to spend their
income, price increases in general will tend to have a regressive impact.
51Yu and Ingene (1982)  and Yoke (1979).
52A  rough approximation (our  calculation) using Roy's identity and a money
measure of utility.
53Gianessi,  Peskin and Wolff, 1979,  Dorfman, 1975.47  -
Over and  above  this, Yan (1975)  found  no  pattern  of  regressivity  or  progressivity
due to the specific price, that increased  as a  result of  environmental policies.
AlBo, in  the area of water pollution control,  the effect  through prices has been
found  to  be  regressive  because  of  differences  in  propensity  to  consume.
Treatment plants, on the other hand, are partly financed through charges and
through local  and federal  taxes.  The impact  of these  charges appear  to  have been
progressive in some cases and regressive in others.
The need to Drotect the Door.  Often, particular measures to protect
the poor from the net effects of environmental policies will not be necessary.
For  example,  where the  distribution  of  benefits is  neutral  or  progressive  and  the
burden of costs falls mainly on the rich, full charges for damages will be
efficient and  will have a positive equity impact.  A theoretical analysis  within
the context of an optimal tax scheme is given in Sandmo (1976).  This model
allows individuals to differ with respect  to productivity and thus income.  The
redistributive objective modifies tax rates in a way well known in  many-person
optimal tax rules.  The revenue collection  terms in  the formulas  given in Box 4
are adjusted downwards for commodities predominantly consumed by the poor and
upwards for those consumed  mostly by the rich.  The adjustment  of the Pigouvian
term depends on an additional factor; the income group's rate of substitution
between the externality itself and the externality creating good.
Thus, if  the low (high)  income  groups suffer  most from  the  damage  of the
externality per unit of utility from  the good itself,  the Pigouvian  term will  be
adjus3ted  upwards  (downwards).  In other  words,  the  Pigouvian  tax  for the
externality-generating  good  will be  adjusted upward by  the  redistributive
weights if  the poor are relatively  more damaged by the externality,  but only if
they are  not  also particularly  dependent on  the consumption of  that good.
Conversely, a polluting activity should be curbed less if its benefits accrue
mostly to the poor and its  negative externalities  mostly to the rich.  It should
be clear from this that equity concerns in themselves do not imply stronger or- 48 -
weaker environmental  protection  measures,  since  parame  os  that  are  theoretically
relevant may go either way and need to be asseseed empirically.
Political Economy and Implementation
If some policies are so much better than others  (for instance, MBI
instruments rather than CAC, direct rather than indirect), why are they not
applied  more in  practice? Recent research  has indicated  that  policy  outcomes are
influenced by who gains and who bears the burden of different strategies.m  If
a  group that prefers one instrument  over another can influence  policy decisions,
it is likely that a policy will be chosen that does not minimize costs.  For
example, Buchanan and  TullocK  (1975)  compare regulation  to an effluent tax, and
note:
Regulation  is  less  desirable  on  efficiency  grounds..  .but  this
instrument will be preferred by those whose behavior is subjected to
either one or the other of the two policy instruments... In their own
private interests,  owners of firms  in  the industry  along  with employees
will oppose the (effluent)  tax.  By contrast,  under  regulation firms  may
well secure  pecuniary  gains from  the imposition  of  direct controls  that
reduce total industry output..  .The political choice setting is..  .the
familiar  one in  which a small,  concentrated, identifiable  and intensely
interested group may exert more influence on political choice making
than the much larger  majority..."
Thus,  a  tax on  emissions is  unpopular  among  influential  polluting  industries  who,
for any given level of abatement effort, strongly prefer not to pay for the
remaining emissions. The agency, on the other hand, is likely  to settle for any
solution that is consistent with its ambience quality goals.  Such an outcome
would  be politically expedient but economically inefficient for the reasons
outlined  earlier.  Those  who pay  the additional  costs  of inefficient  intervention
are  citizens  at  large, often  badly  organized  compared to  the  industry in
9  See Hahn (1989) for a brief review and interpretation,  see also Baumol
and Oates (1979) and (1988),  Dewees (1983),  Buchanan and Tullock (1975).- 49 -
question.  In  addition  to the inefficiency  problems  already  mentioned, real  world
CAC policies tend to be selective  and thus very  prone to rent  seeking behavior."
Empirical  evidence  on incidence  and its  role in  implementation  is  scant.
Few doubt that industries influence their regulatory environment and indeed,
under CAC,  it is probably conducive to efficiency that they do, as long as the
regulatory  agency  is well  equipped.  The  more  prominent  challenge  for  a
regulatory agency is probably to make sure that both the potential competition
of the affected industry and citizens in general are well represented.
s5  Zeckhauser (1981)  advises that: (i)  effective policy takes account of
both the net benefits a policy offers and the probability that the policy will
be adopted; (ii)  the probability that the policy is adopted depends on the
distribution of benefits and costs it confers on organized and unorganized
constituencies; and (iii) simple analytic  models provide a framework that not
only should prove helpful prescriptively but also helps explain some observed
aspects of the policy formulation  process that might otherwise appear
puzzling. Other authors allow policies to result from  maximizing behavior of
different interest groups, including  the regulating and enforcing agency (Lee,
1984, Linder and McBride, 1984) and procontrol citizen groups (Downing  1981).- 50  -
5.  SUMMARY AND AN AGENDA FOR DCVELOPING COUNTRIES
The case for government intervention  tc address pollution problems is
reasonably well established in  the literature; many pollution problems involve
such large numbers of potentially  affected individuals that the absence of
intervention is  likely  to be  costly and  result in  too  much pollution.  The  policy
objective is  to induce economic agents to internalize  the pollution externality
in their behavior.  Governments must choose from a range of policy instruments
by comparing  broadly defined benefits and  costs.  In this paper  we have reviewed
the theoretical and empirical literature comparing  these instruments.  The main
issue we  want  to  discuss  in  this  last section  is which  of  these  general
recommendations are of particular relevance to  developing countries.  Which
policy  instruments  are  more  appropriate (in  other  words,  efficient,  implementable
and  equitable)  given  the  constraints  that  developing  country  governments
confront?  What research must be done in  order to provide better answers to the
questions we have raised?
Choosing Policy Instruments in Develoging Countries
Our goal has been to show how problem specific conditions should shape
control policies, and  that high  and unnecessary  costs are  easily incurred if  one
does not take into account conditions such as:  (i)  institutional  and technical
capacity; ii)  revenue constraints; (iii)  uncertainty; (iv)  market structure;  and
(v) distributive implications.
The earlier sections outlined some broad guidelines based on a review
of the literature.  Some of the more important conclusions are as follows:
--  Market  based  incentives  (MBIs) minimize  the  social  costs  o-
achieving  a  given  environmental  improvement and  thus  dominate
command and control (CAC)  approaches.
--  Among MBIs, price based  approaches are generally  equivalent to
marketable  permits  in terms  of  efficiency, when  administrative
costs,  uncertainty and  other complicating factors,  are ignored.  It
is not  possible to conclude in  general  whether administrative  costs
are more onerous with one regime or the other.
--  Among price  based  MBIs,  +axes  and subsidies  can be  equally  efficient
in the short run.  Such schemes should target damage or emissions
directly, if  possible,  and the  rate should  be set  so  that the social
cost  of  the  damage  is  internalized by  the  polluter.  For  an- 51 -
incentive scheme to be efficient in  the longer  term, the arguments
for taxing pollution rather than subsidizing abatement are strong.
--  Indirect instruments, such as taxes and subsidies on inputs and
outputs, may be efficient second best choices if targeting damages
or  emissions directly is  not  possible  due  to the costs  of  monitoring
and enforcement.
--  When public funds are scarce, taxes, charges and permits sold at
market prices have the additional advantage  cf generating revenue.
--  If  there is  uncertainty  about  abatement  costs,  price instruments  (as
opposed to permits) can  ensure that one does not embark on policies
that result in surprisingly high costs for only moderate benefits.
In contrast to  permits, however,  the price instruments  do result in
uncertainty about resulting emissions.
Applying  these  broad  guidelines  in  practice  requires  taking into  account
the specific characteristics of the country as well as of the pollution problem
itself.
Develoning  country  characteristics. Although  the  pollution  problems  and
the economic conditions of individual developing countries are diverse, it is
nonetheless useful to review how general considerations for this group could
affect the choice of policy instrument.  One important characteristic is that
pollution abatement is likely to be relatively  costly in developing as compared
to  developed countries.  Private businesses  are  confronted  with constraints  that
can make it more costly to reduce emissions no matter which policy instruments
are used.  They often face  a high cost of capital,  partly due to the inefficient
state of the formal financial  markets (see  World Bank 1989).  Moreover, modern
technology and relevant expertise may be scarce in developing countries.  Some
countries  are saddled  with an  outdated  production  technology  built  when  pollution
was not deemed to be such an important  concern.  Limited technological capacity
will also constrain the ability of public authorities to monitor and enforce,
which increases the dead weight losses  related to any intervention  scheme.  On
the  other hand, only moderate and  inexpensive abatement initiatives may  be
required,  if  the  pressure  on  the  environment  is  low  at  early  stages of
development.- 52 -
hdnother  concern is based  on  irstitutional  capacity.  The emissions of
ri'.y  pc;d'utants can only  be imperfectly  monitored,  and the  fact that  monitoring
,5  to  ren2t  in monetary inplications for the polluter does not make the task
iseior.  In  the  U.S.,  for example,  the Environmental  Protection  Agency  has 14,000
e  ~i0yeC3  (federal level only), and even so most sources are not continuously
r-nit  -ro'dJ.  The monitoring  problem  is  likely to  be  worse  for regulatory
age,ncies  in  de-eloping countries since  they are  often badly funded  and have less
access  to  technology and trained manpower.  The abilitl to monitor in a  cost-
effective way iB  important for the choice of instruments, because many of the
poiular theoretical recommendations are predicated on an ability to discern
e:-issions  fr3m each individual polluter.  A further dimension of institutional
capacity  is  the regulatory  agency's  ability  to  design  and  administer  new  schemes,
since  behavior  will change only if  a threat  to penalize noncompliance  is seen  as
credible.  Even in  developed countr.es, sophisticated schemes, such as permit
trading, have run foul of implementation issues (Hahn 1990).
Finally,  distributive  implications  are  important. The  political  economy
of  policy reform can give very costly outcomes in developing countries, where
privileged groups are often  stronger and do  not have to contend with wel'-
entcenched institutional processes.  Mechanisms for compensating transfers are
often not well-developed, and any reform must, therefore, also take account of
the  impact  on  the most vulnerable groups in society.
Im2iiiationB for  olcy  refor  . These considerations  might affect the
broad  guidelines regarding the ranking of policy instruments.  They probably
strengthen  considerably  the  case  for  price  based  versus  quantity  based
interventions,  particularly  if the  instrurtients  are based only indirectly on
dar,iages  or  emissions.  In an uncertain world, price based instruments provide
greater  certainty  regarding  abatement  costs.  Such instruments  are superior  when
'Clifford  Russel  (1990)  notes that the EPA largely trusts corporations in
ccmrpliance  and self-reporting,  even though experience with motor vehicles has
shown that active tampering (not  only inadequate  operation and maintenance) is
prevalent.- 53 -
there is  concern  that  underestimating  the costs  would yield  controls  that  are  too
strict and envirornmental  quality that is "too high".  Such concerns arguably
perBist  in  many  developing  countries,  and  then  price  inBtruments  can  be
particularly helpful.  Second, even though quantity based interventions that
incorporate aspects of MBIs  (such as tradeable permits) have many attractive
attributes, they will in most cases imply  the setting up of new administrative
systems.  Many countries already have ways of charging for or taxing relevant
commodities, and the administrative capacity to manipulate domestic relative
prices is often well established.  What price based interventions and permits
have  in common is that they  can generate revenue.  However,  the potential
contribution of revenues  from pollution control  instruments, like taxes or
prices, is small in relation to the overall needs of the treasury.
The  costs  of  monitoring  emissions  or  damages  and  of  enforcing
instruments related  to them can  be high,  particularly in  LDCs, for  technological
and institutional  reasons.  Then, indirect  taxes and charges (taxes/subsidies  to
marketed inputa  and  outputs) are  desirable  because  they  depend less  on  vulnerable
and costly  monitorina  and  enforcement  functiona. However,  these instruments  also
imply  additional  ;osts because  they  can  only  imperfectly mimic  monitored
emissions  and damages.  Good indirect instruments affect the profitability of
abatement options without affecting other choices.  The balance between ideal
incentives and the costs of implementing them depends on the links among the
demands of various commodities (in  other words, the cross price elasticities of
demand),  on the degree of  technical substitutability  among  various inputs  and on
how  emissions  are affected  by  different  actions. The choice  of which  commodities
to tax and at what rates should also be sensitive to the probable incidence.
These  issues  should  be  the  subject  of  future  research.
These considerations do not mean that instruments such as tradeable
permits should  not be attempted, but that less  sophisticated instruments should
be considered wherever they have the potential to do much of the  job in an
implementable, low cost way.  Then, monitoring and enforcement capacity can be- 54 -
developed  and  prioritized  for  remaining problem  sectors/pollutants.  Also,
schemes that encourage self-compliance,  such as deposit refund systems, should
be considered.  Many developed countries are just starting  to investigate  these
possibilities.
Research Agenda
Given the set  of conceptual and empirical studies  we have reviewed, we
think that future research efforts should include  the following areas.
Case studies  on the source and severity  of problem.  What are the  main
pollution  problems  in  typical  developing  countries  and  what  policies  are
currently  in  place to  address  them?  What  other  public policies  have  affected  the
magnitudes of these problems, and how?  The benefits of pollution control, the
costs  of  abatement,  the constraints  on  available  instruments  all  have  significant
problem  and site  specific characteristics. The main objective  ehould  be to gain
insights into the constraints on and aspects of instrument choice that may be
different from those in developed countries.
Empirical estimation of the costs of oollution control.  The costs of
pollution control depend on (i) the flexibility of consumers to substitute to
less polluting  consumption patterns;  (ii) the  flexibility of  producers to
substitute to less polluting inputs/processes; and  (iii) the extent to which
policy instruments can be found that can stimulate such change.  Commodity
specific pollution coefficients will make it possible to estimate the costs of
internalizing  pollution externalities through the demand system.  Demand system
estimation provides inputa  to analyze of overall costs  of pollution control, as
well  as  the  incidence  and  revenue  implications.  Estimating  substitution
possibilities  on  the  production  side,  including  the  related  response  in
emissions, is  also  necessary. Both  engineering  and  econometric  approaches  should
be used in this effort.  Applying the taxes on imperfect  emission proxies, such
as  input use, allows  for tests on the costs of monitoring  and enforcement
constraints.- _5 -
Conceptual  and  empirical  work  on  instrument  choice.  The  costs  of
monitoring  and  enforcement,  apart  from  considerations  of  political  economy,
deserve  a  more  explicit  treatrrment  in  order  for  the  practical  challenges  of
instrument  choice  to be understooCd.  The  problem  of providing  incentives  under
information  constraints,  particularly  when  information  about  damages  is
asymmetricAlly  distributed,  is  not  sufficiently  explored  in  environmental
applications.  Besides  conceptual work,  empirical  work  will  be  needed  on
monitoring/enforcement  Costs.  These  need  to  be weighed against the costs of
indirect instruments, which provide an alternative that fails to offer some
desired incentives but in return yields lower costs of monitoring/enforcement
costs.- 56  -
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